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The proliferation of efforts to ‘replicate’ Silicon Valley’s
success – from Iran, to Russia, to the Ohio River valley – is a
noteworthy trend. As Rosenberg argues in his study of
these attempts, Silicon Valley has become a ‘symbol for the
way forward.it is not enough to admire or envy Silicon
Valley: countries that have any pretence of joining (or forarch Center, Hanyang
r
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hathat matter remaining in) the ranks of theworld’s advanced
economies have no choice but to imitate it’ (Rosenberg,
2002, p. 1).
In this article, I take an in-depth look at one such
project – the establishment of a technology and educational
complex outside of Moscow, dedicated to promoting inno-
vation. The set of interrelated initiatives, which are referred
to in this article as the ‘Skolkovo project’, were centerpieces
of Medvedev’s much touted efforts to ‘modernize’ the
Russian economy during his presidential period. One might
say that Medvedev, faced with the complexity of the
economy, societal restrictions and the strictures of path
dependency in realizing a modernist project, opted for
‘miniaturization’ (Scott, 1998). While historical modern-
izing leaders elsewhere have created model villages or
model collective farms, the Russian leadership launched
Skolkovo as a model of what a modern Russian economy
‘should’ look like.nyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Innovation Center (a high-tech business incubator sup-
ported by the Skolkovo Foundation) and 2 educational in-
stitutions, is still under development and is frequently
dismissed as a Potemkin village bound to fail. While others
have examined the Skolkovo project with a macroeco-
nomic perspective and an eye towards predicting whether
it (and Russia’s innovation policy more generally) can
succeed, this article takes a different approach. Rather than
evaluating Skolkovo’s viability, the aim is to identify elite
socio-political discourses surrounding the construction of
Skolkovo. How particular moments are navigated – for
example, securing a balance between government and
private actors in the Skolkovo project or seeking networks
internationally – can be seen as illustrative of how broader
challenges in Russian governance are being (or failing to
be) addressed.
The analysis in this article draws upon scholarly tradi-
tions in the history and philosophy of science (HPS)/science
and technology studies (STS) and argues that a state’s
approach to science and to governance more broadly are
mutually constituted phenomena.1 In other words, how a
state deals with questions of knowledge shores up and
reinforces the approach to governance in that particular
polity (and vice versa). This HPS/STS literature is reviewed
brieﬂy ﬁrst, including both broader conceptual issues and
studies on Soviet and Russian science relevant as backdrop
for the Skolkovo project. Subsequently, we turn to the case
study of socio-political discourses surrounding the Skol-
kovo project, which is grounded in an analysis of 310media
articles from state-owned Rossiskaya Gazeta. Three key
themes in ‘Skolkovo talk’ are identiﬁed: 1) achieving bal-
ance between public and private steering of the project, 2)
ﬁnding equilibrium between national and international
inﬂuence and 3) envisioning the future of the project and,
by extension, of Russia. The broader signiﬁcance of these
themes for the modernization project and state–science
relations is highlighted in the conclusion.
2. Science and the state
In their examination of scientiﬁc debates in early
modern England, Shapin and Schaffer famously asserted,
‘solutions to the problem of knowledge are solutions to the
problem of social order’ (1985, p. 332). With these words,
they were arguing for the broader signiﬁcance of science
studies. Their seminal book illustrated how approaches to
science reﬂected broader socio-political trends and how
science also supported or subverted approaches to social
and political governance more broadly.
Shapin and Schaffer specify that science occupies the
same ‘terrain’ as politics in three key ways. Firstly, scientiﬁc
practitioners and their activities contribute to creating and
maintaining the polity in which they operate. For example,
the fact that the Soviet leadership was saturated with en-
gineers and technical specialists may have propagated and
sustained the state’s traditions of social engineering and1 See Jasanoff (2004) for a more detailed discussion and examples of
the ‘co-production’ of scientiﬁc and political order.rigid long-term planning. Secondly, the products of science
become parts of the political activity of the state. An
obvious example here, explored in detail by historians of
Soviet science, is the role of nuclear weapons in main-
taining a balance of power between the USA and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War (Roberg, 1998). Thirdly, scien-
tiﬁc endeavors are supported (ﬁnancially and politically)
and valued ‘insofar as the state or its various agencies see a
point in them’ (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985, p. 339, see also
p. 332). A greater push for commercial relevance of science
(nanotechnology, innovation) is one clear, recent manifes-
tation of this in Russia today (Connolly, 2013; Graham &
Dezhina, 2008). These clear manifestations of the ‘shared
terrains’ identiﬁed by Shapin and Schaffer suggest that
seeking to understand broader political trends in Russia
through the lens of science and knowledge projects is a
fruitful and legitimate avenue for analysis, and the article
takes its point of departure in this assertion.
2.1. Soviet science
As background for the Skolkovo case that follows and to
further explore the science-politics ‘terrains’ identiﬁed
above, we now turn to ﬁrst Soviet science heritage and then
current Russian science politics in greater detail. In the
most recent comprehensive work on the Soviet/Russian
science establishment, Graham and Dezhina pick up on this
point about the overlapping terrains of politics and science.
They argue that the Soviet system of science reﬂected the
broader economic and political order of Soviet society, in
that it was ‘centralized and authoritarian’ (Graham &
Dezhina, 2008, p. 163). Although it is notoriously difﬁcult
to measure, the Soviet science establishment was also
comparatively large, and represented a high cost to the
Soviet state, with between 10% and 30%more scientists and
engineers than the United States by the 1980s (Graham &
Dezhina, 2008, p. 5). These researchers were distributed
across three main locations of scientiﬁc activity: a univer-
sity system devoted primarily to pedagogy (Dezhina, 2011),
the Academy of Sciences system of research institutes, and
research bodies within the ministries of industry and
defence.
With the advent of post-war ‘big science’ challenges, like
space exploration and atomic physics, there was a push to
move from a system of science research that was narrowly
organized by discipline to more integrative, large-scale
research ‘cities’ (naukogrady). These research clusters –
often built to be examples of the modern or even futuristic
city – were based in the tradition of both scientiﬁc utopias
and shaped by the frameworks and demands of Soviet po-
litical, economic and ideological developments (Josephson,
1997).
In describing one such ‘city of science’ built in Siberia,
Akademgorodok, Paul R. Josephson points to the central yet
precarious position that science held in the Soviet project.
Although Akademgorodok was initially meant to be a place
of free exchange and ﬂow of ideas and received top political
support for this from its political champion, Nikita
Khrushchev, this ‘city of science’ saw its freedom curtailed
in the Brezhnev era, with an increasing emphasis on
applied research and the insistence that Soviet scientists
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entiﬁc or political thought’ (Josephson, 1997, p. xvii). The
changing fate of Akademgorodok illustrates a key charac-
teristic of the Soviet state’s relation to science more
generally: an ‘ironic tension between the view of science as
a supremely rational endeavor.and the insistence of many
administrators, economic planners and scientists alike that
science is inherently political since it must reﬂect broader
social goals and cultural aspirations.’ (Josephson, 1997,
p. xviii).
Khruschev’s support for the Akademgorodok project,
and for ‘big science’ more generally, grew from his ﬁrst-
hand impressions from a trip to the United States in 1959.
The Soviet research centers of Troitsk, Dubna, Puschchino
and Akademgorodok were, in part, inspired by his visits to
American universities which he ‘took to be cities of science’
(Josephson, 1997, p. 9). This all has a certain parallel to
Medvedev’s own 2009 visit to Silicon Valley, which gave
form and impetus to the Skolkovo project (Zavrazhin &
Kuz’min, 2010a, 2010b). As we shall see below, these
modernistic science cities serve in part a model for Skol-
kovo, but also represent a heritage from which Skolkovo
proponents actively attempt to distance themselves.
2.2. Science in the post-Soviet period
To bring us swiftly up to the context in which Skolkovo
has been proposed and partially realized, a brief review of
the fate of the Soviet science establishment in the inter-
vening 20 years since the Soviet collapse is necessary. The
established science system of the USSR was challenged
seriously in the immediate post-Soviet period. The federal
budget for science was reduced by nearly 80% and a dra-
matic out-migration of talented scientists took place
(Graham & Dezhina, 2008, p. vii; Gerber & Yarsike Ball,
2002, p. 185). Although the three main pillars of Russian
science (universities, Academy of Science system, and in-
dustrial/defence research establishment) remained rela-
tively unchanged in their structure, Russian scientists
found themselves navigating a sea-change in terms of the
amount of funding available and how it was to be acquired
(Graham & Dezhina, 2008).
Scholars of Russian science argue that in many ways
Russian science has ‘recovered’ from this post-Soviet up-
heaval and that the brain-drain of scientists has been
reduced dramatically (Gerber & Yarsike Ball, 2002; Graham
& Dezhina, 2008). However, little research has been done
on the broader political signiﬁcance of state–science re-
lations in post-Soviet Russia. The question, then, is what to
make of the Soviet past in shaping the Skolkovo present.
It is clear from the preceding sub-section that Soviet
science–state relations were complicated and fraught with
difﬁculties. The intensity of the interaction and the expec-
tations the state had of science and scientists may have
been especially pronounced in the Soviet Union, given the
unique nature of the Soviet project with its pursuit of in-
dependent global dominance in all ﬁelds (from technology
to resource development) and the highly centralized and
authoritarian political system. As Graham (1993, p. 158)
puts it, the relationship between science and political au-
thority in the Soviet Union was characterized by drama inlarge part because of the ‘obvious necessity for a modern-
izing state to rely on the technical intelligentsia to achieve
its goals. But neither the tsarist nor the Soviet government
was willing to accept the full political implications of this
reliance’. The relationship between science and politics in
the Soviet Union did not settle and fade into the unques-
tioned background as it has done in many other countries
(evidenced by our difﬁculty in conceptualizing science as
‘political’), but rather remained an issue of periodically
intense political focus.
While the connection between past and present should
not be automatically assumed, policymakers and publics
tend to be parsimonious in their interpretations. The
number of rhetorical angles available is normally con-
strained (but not delimited) by pre-existing institutional
and discursive commitments operating at group and indi-
vidual levels (Krasner, 1988; Roe, 1991). On the other hand,
debates in social science about the relationship between
structure and agency remind us not to ignore the capacity
of individual and collective actors to make fresh choices
and even seek to change the rules of the game (Abbott,
1995; Wimmer, 2002). In sum, irrespective of the level of
path dependency we ascribe between the past and the
present in today’s Russia, it is this weighty and interesting
Soviet heritage that serves as a referential backdrop for the
Skolkovo project. As we shall see below, Skolkovo actors
actively engage with this heritage, either to draw upon its
glory or to distinguish their new project from any
predecessor.
3. Skolkovo: discourses on the role of the state, the
future and the foreign
In many ways, the Skolkovo project was the epitome of
Medvedev’s modernization ‘campaign’. The idea of
modernization has deep historical roots in Russia – from
Peter the Great’s dream of a Europeanized Russia to the
Soviet attempt at a leap from a peasant society to an urban
industrial one. Under Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012),
the notion of modernization gained new currency in
Russian politics. In autumn 2009, Medvedev published a
liberal manifesto, Forward Russia! (Medvedev 2009). Its
centerpiece was the idea that Russia had been increasingly
lagging behind developed countries in science, technology
and economics due to corruption and dependency on
natural resources.
What modernization was actually supposed to mean as
a vision for Russia’s future and as an engine for economic,
social and political change remained ambiguous. In
particular, the question of whether modernizationwas also
to include a liberalization of Russia’s politics was at one
point hotly contested, although optimism on that point has
largely faded (Devyatkov & Makarychev, 2012; Malinova,
2012; Marganiya, 2010; Zaostrovtsev, 2010). As the case
study in this section shows, the Skolkovo project itself
embodies the ambiguities and aspirations of the modern-
ization project more broadly.
The Skolkovo project was launched in Medvedev’s 2009
address to the Federal Assembly. Conceptual work and
attending legislation then proceeded at what was proudly
described by Kremlin top aide Arkady Dvorkovich as a
E. Wilson Rowe / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 39–4742‘record fast’ pace (Emel’yanenkov, 2010a), with a number of
concessions meant to address constraints to innovation in
Russia. A laundry list of obstacles to innovation-based
economic development includes: unfavorable legal and
bureaucratic environment around imports/exports, unfa-
vorable taxation regime, low investment in research and
development (R&D), weakly developed property and in-
tellectual rights, low domestic demand for the products of
innovation, lack of coordination between government
bodies, poor infrastructure and low levels of access to
ﬁnance (Connolly, 2011; Dezhina, 2011; Klochikhin, 2012;
Spiesberger, 2011). The Rossiskaya Gazeta (RG) coverage
analyzed below included voices, especially from scientiﬁc
establishments and private business associations, con-
cerned about the feasibility of the project because of these
existing constraints (Fyodorov, 2010; Kalysheva, 2011a,
2011b; Petrov, 2010).
In seeking to address these challenges, the Skolkovo
enthusiasts work included garnering substantial state
funding and developing and gaining legislative approval for
a number a number of key privileges for Skolkovo actors.
Examples of these concessions are tax exemptions, simpli-
ﬁed technical regulations, special sanitary and ﬁre safety
norms, special cooperation agreements (with the Ministry
of Interior, Federal Migration Service, Federal Tax service,
Federal Customs Service, Federal Patent Ofﬁce), creation of
new R&D centers and eased processes for hiring foreign
specialists (Dezhina, 2011, 98). These concessions generated
a lot of coverage in RG (RG, 2010a on tax incentives; Kukol,
2010a; RG., 2010b on the Skolkovo land grant; RG., 2010c;
RG, 2010d; Kukol, 2010b on the relaxed visa regime).
The extent to which this massive funding and set of
privileges will be enough for Skolkovo ﬁrms to overcome
the challenges listed above is an important question for
research. The case study presented in this article, however,
takes a different tack and sees the importance of the
Skolkovo project not in whether it succeeds or fails. Given
the interlinkages between science and politics explored
above (both conceptually and in the Soviet Union and
Russia), the aim of the case study is to identify and analyze
the socio-political discourses that have surrounded (and
even been challenged by) the Skolkovo project. In other
words, what can Skolkovo tell us about discourses of
innovation and science as well as the wider political chal-
lenges and currents in Russia? After a brief note on
methods, we turn to the key themes identiﬁed in the
context of the media study, which are as follows: foreigners
and foreign experience in Skolkovo, navigating the public-
private divide, and visions for the future of Russia.
3.1. Methods
This study is based in a discursive and quantitative
analysis of 310 newspaper articles that were tagged as
‘Skolkovo-related’ on the website of a government-owned
newspaper, Rossiskaya Gazeta (date range: 2009–2012).2
In addition to standard journalistic fare, Rossiskaya Gazeta2 See www.rg.ru/sujet/4064/index.html for an overview of the Skol-
kovo tagged articles.publishes information on behalf of the Russian govern-
ment, like committee lists and new legislation, and also
regularly prints extensive interviews with government
actors. In this way, the newspaper is oriented towards
readers who ﬁnd such information of interest or use, for
example those who are employed in or intersect with
Russian government sectors.
As this chapter aims to trace the socio-political dis-
courses around Skolkovo as propagated by Russia’s political
elite, rather than, say, reﬂecting the breadth of Russian
discourses on Skolkovo, the ofﬁcial and relatively conser-
vative status of the newspaper is an advantage for the
analysis. The arguments and voices included in its pages are
likely to be oriented towards and considered acceptable by
ofﬁcialdom. Furthermore, limiting the analysis to one, well-
chosen media source allowed for a relevant and large
sample, yet also represented a critical delimitation. This
delimitation ensured that ‘analytical cherrypicking’ in
assembling the sample was avoided (e.g. as opposed to
casting a wide net to many news sources yet only choosing
statements that are in line with pre-existing prejudices/
expectations). The entire universe of statements about
Skolkovo in RG had to thus be considered in the analysis.
The methodological approach was contextualist and
explorative, in that I was creating the thematic tags and
identifying topics of importance from the empirical mate-
rial provided by the case study rather than taking a
particular theory or hypothesis as the analytical starting
point (Mjøset, 2009). After an initial read of all articles, the
three themes identiﬁed below stood out as especially
dominant topics within the media coverage. In a subse-
quent re-reading, the content was coded according to the
three themes to ensure that all statements relating to these
rather open topics would be considered in the analysis.
Speciﬁc factors relating to international and domestic
cooperation agreements were recorded, forming the basis
of the two numbers-based ﬁgures below (presenting ﬁnd-
ings relating to the public/private and national/domestic
divides in the Skolkovo project). The factors recorded were
who was representing Skolkovo in a given networking
event or agreement (for example, at the preparation or
signing of a memorandum of understanding) and whether
the network or agreement involved primarily domestic ac-
tors or international actors.
3.2. Foreigners and foreign experience in Skolkovo?
As Rosenberg (2002) explores in his study of ‘new’ Sil-
icon Valleys around the world, Silicon Valley is an amor-
phous idea. While the esthetic of glassy, modern ofﬁce
buildings and the presence of a fewmultinationals and few
government research institutes are easy enough to repli-
cate and the problems of favorable tax framework, exis-
tence of venture capital and a skilled workforce are not
insurmountable, there is still something ineffable about the
‘basic chemistry’ and how these pieces ﬁt together in a way
to achieve success (Rosenberg, 2002, p. 2). Clearly, any
successful project in any new political setting would need
to consider and relate to the experience of other states. This
section explores the ambitions inspired and tensions
introduced by foreign experience in the Skolkovo project.
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of replicating Silicon Valley. During a visit to Silicon Valley –
from which he twittered his ﬁrst ‘tweet’ and was the ﬁrst
Russian to gain possession of an Iphone 4 – then President
Medvedev put it this way: ‘No one is planning on copying
Silicon Valley, because that is truly impossible. But some
principles would be nice to apply to Russia.The most
important is that our idea about Skolkovo preserves the
spirit that exists here’ (in Zavrazhin & Kuz’min, 2010a). At
the same time, he emphasized that there was to be a
learning curve: ‘We are not afraid to learn. We have to
acknowledge that in many ways we have fallen behind’ (in
Zavrazhin & Kuz’min, 2010b).
Medvedev also worked to promote a vision of Skolkovo
as a placewhere the categories of national and international
are effectively elided and rendered irrelevant, in which it
would notmatterwhose experienceswere used and talents
employed. Medvedev argued: ‘This is not an effort to copy
the experience of Silicon Valley.our task is broader. The
formation of conditions attractive to scientists, engineers,
constructionworkers, programmers and also establishing a
stimuli for cooperativeprojectswith businessmanagers and
ﬁnanciers.Wewon’t distinguish betweenwho is ‘ours’ and
who is an ‘outsider’ (in Emel’yanenkov, 2010a).
Then chief Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov side-
stepped the tricky issue about the adoption of foreign
experience this way: ‘We want to establish at Skolkovo a
new atmosphere – and this is not to insult or go against
anyone in Russia. This is a blank page project, unique like
Silicon Valley in the USA and Shanghai in China’ (in
Zakatnova, 2011). Asserting that the Skolkovo project was
something fundamentally new was a response to a critical
discussion in the Duma about Skolkovo remaking the
wheel and overlapping with existing science cities (an issue
of how Skolkovo relates to the past to which we will return
below). Surkov later felt it necessary to address complaints
about foreign involvement at Skolkovo more directly,
refuting the logic of these criticisms: ‘We will not be
operating here with a false concept of patriotism. In my
view, to be a patriot today is to wish for as many foreigners
as possible working in Russia’ (in Shkel’, 2010a).
Key Skolkovo actors also engaged in this debate about
foreigners and foreign experience in the project, evidencing
both an awareness of the political terrain around the issue.
Head of the Skolkovo Fund, Russian oligarch Viktor Vek-
selberg, in describing Skolkovo Innovation Centre’s educa-
tional cooperation with MIT, felt it necessary to underline
that ‘fromtheveryoutset,wehave insisted that thiswill be a
Russian university with the possibility of active cooperation
with specialists from other Russian institutes of higher ed-
ucation. Russia has a strong scientiﬁc tradition and Ameri-
cans will not be in key posts in the running of the institute’
(in Kalysheva, 2011a, 2011b).
At the same time, Skolkovo actors frequently and
proudly emphasized the international nature of the project.
One Skolkovo head stated plainly: ‘We have two languages
at Skolkovo – English and Russian. And precisely in that
order – speaking English is an absolute condition for
participation in the Skolkovo project’ (in Arganovich, 2011;
see also Gerasimenko, 2010; Roze, 2012 on the interna-
tional nature of science). The appointment of foreignersalso attracted (largely positive) attention, with appoint-
ments of international innovation stars such Nobel Laure-
ate Roger Kongberg to the Skolkovo Scientiﬁc Board (RG,
2010e) and Craig Barrett, former CEO of Intel (RG, 2010f),
to a top position in the Skolkovo Foundation and Innova-
tion Centre. Furthermore, as Fig. 1 shows, networking ac-
tivity with international actors certainly outweighed
domestic networking activity.
An interesting aspect of the domestic agreements re-
ported by RG is that they were nearly absent at the start of
the project (2009) and became increasingly prominent in
the years thereafter. This likely has to do with domestic
backlash against the international nature of the project and
an increasingly obvious need to keep disgruntled domestic
stakeholders on board. For example, at a regional scientiﬁc
meeting in St. Petersburg, the head of Mordovia (Nikolai
Merushkin) noted that Skolkovo was done ‘without any
diplomacy.[Moscow] practically didn’t consult’ with
regional government on Skolkovo issues (in Emel’yanenkov,
2010b, see also Titov, 2010). The uptick in domestic agree-
ments shows that a positive reputation for Skolkovo within
Russia’s borders was also deemed important and pursued
by Skolkovo’s proponents.
The tension around foreign experience (and foreign
talent) in the Skolkovo project is a prominent one. Skol-
kovo’s proponents attempted to soften the international
image of the project through engagement with domestic
audiences and distancing the project from international
experience, and worked to refute the underlying logic of
such criticisms. This skepticism towards the international
relates to the practical difﬁculties of copying any kind of
political or economic experience in an entirely new loca-
tion, but also likely to the potential political pitfall of
appearing to wholeheartedly embrace a foreign economic
model. While national pride or patriotism may make
foreign models a touchy case in many countries, this
skepticism may be particularly pronounced in Russia,
where many Russian politicians and citizens felt let down
by models of ‘Western’ democracy and markets after the
tumultuous 1990s. Furthermore, and despite the interna-
tional nature of much of the scientiﬁc endeavor, we see that
the issue of national versus international science, which
was prominent during the Soviet period (Josephson, 1997)
and is discussed above, continues to be a salient one in
Russian policy circles (see also Wilson Rowe, 2013).3.3. Navigating the public-private divide
One could also argue that the question of foreign versus
domestic experience in shaping the Skolkovo project has to
do with the ‘identity’ of the project or how the project was
meant to be perceived by outsiders and experienced by
those involved in Skolkovo. Another key point of this
identity – and yet another dichotomy – is the question of
whether the project is a state or private endeavor. The vast
majority of Skolkovo’s funding comes from governmental
budget lines, yet governmental actors actively worked to
promote the ‘private’ sector identity of the project. Drawing
a line between business and the state seems to have been
important for those involved.
International
Domestic
Fig. 1. Relationship between number of domestic networking meetings/
agreements (#) and international meetings/agreements (#) carried out by
Skolkovo representatives.
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clear about who should head the Skolkovo fund, stating
that ‘we need a businessman’ (RG, 2010g). The busi-
nessman appointed turned out to be the Russian oligarch
Victor Vekselberg, who also pursued this line of concern
about delineating between Skolkovo’s business and
governmental status, albeit with a sense of humor about
the issue. For example, Medvedev and Vekselberg had this
exchange in 2012 while evaluating the ﬁrst year of Skol-
kovo’s activity (in Kuz’min, 2010):
Medvedev: On the whole, it isn’t going badly. Skolkovo
ofﬁcials are working well.
Vekselberg: Dmitry Anatolievich, a request. Don’t call us
ofﬁcials. We struggle against this.
Medvedev (smiling): You are not ofﬁcials. You are rep-
resentatives of a non-commercial organization.
Medvedev also later underlined that a key to the success
of the Skolkovo project will depend on government
knowing when to withdraw: ‘I underline that it is very
important for the government in this issue to determine
when to drop this work, when to leave this ﬁeld so that
private business feels peaceful and comfortable’ (in
Kuz’min, 2011a).
Both top political leaders (Medvedev, Putin, and
governmental ministers) and Skolkovo’s own set of repre-
sentatives have been active in promoting the project to
potential international and domestic partners. In an effort
to trace the balance between state and private sector
intervention in this public and outwardly oriented
networking activity, the ‘lead’ person in a networking ac-
tivity was identiﬁed as either private sector or state sector.
As we can see in Fig. 2, private actors clearly outweighed
state actors in this representative function. Of course, how
decisions weremade regarding Skolkovo and the balance of
power or degree of collaboration between state and private
actors must remain in the realm of speculation. However,
what we can take from this ﬁgure is that it was important
to give Skolkovo top leadership support while maintaining
a largely private-sector outward face to the project. This
relates to another aspect of Skolkovo that key state actors,
for example Medvedev and then Kremlin aide Arkady
Dvorkovich, were at pains to stress – the centrality of valuesof openness and transparency in the Skolkovo project.
Medvedev put it this way. ‘Skolkovo – it’s not a closed get-
together. It is a public project, around which should
develop our entire modernization direction.If we achieve
this, the Skolkovo effect will be colossal’ (in Kuz’min,
2011b; see Sidibe, 2011 for Dvorkovich’s take).
While Putin’s presidencies were marked by an effort to
regain state control of the ‘commanding heights of the
economy’, particularly in the energy sector, state actors
involved in Skolkovo demonstrated awareness of the
challenges involved in this aspiration to control. Given the
tricky relations that Russia’s brand of state capitalism en-
tails and the fears that it has fostered amongst foreign in-
vestors, Skolkovo actors seem to realize that a highly
interventionist state seemed at odds with the vision of a
new Silicon Valley outside of Moscow. Values of openness
and transparency – and the government ‘leaving the ﬁeld’
at some point – were seen as valuable and important
techniques for attracting private sector investment in the
project. As we shall see in the third and ﬁnal discursive
theme identiﬁed below, the Skolkovo project may have
been a roundabout way of talking of the importance of
these values for Russia’s future development as well.3.4. A city of the future – and a future for Russia?
Modernization projects tend to be, fundamentally, about
the future. They are about departing from some backward
present and marching towards a brighter tomorrow (Scott,
1998). The amount of attention paid to this brighter
tomorrowwas a striking aspect of how the Skolkovo project
was presented in the pages of RG. Descriptions of Skolkovo
were saturated with a language of ‘green’, ‘modern’ and
‘future.’ This applied to nearly everything from the housing
that would be built around Skolkovo (ecological ‘smart’
houses from Denmark), through how recycling would be
done (based on Swedish experience) to the way of life and
persons that will be fostered there.
In many ways, a pleasant, modern infrastructure was
seen as fundamental to attracting the kind of human capital
that the Skolkovo project required. For example, Viktor
Vekselberg, Russian businessman and head of the Skolkovo
Fund, argued that Skolkovo will be ‘a city that is comfort-
able for work, life and relaxation – an example of the city of
the future’ (in Blagoveshenskiy, 2010). Vice President of the
Skolkovo Fund, Stanislav Naumov, forwards a vision of not
only Skolkovo’s infrastructure but also its residents (in
Zykova, 2012):
Sometimes I look into the eyes of a person and I un-
derstand that he will work at Skolkovo.[Who belongs
in Skolkovo?] Two unique friendly faces. There is the 50
year old man in jeans from the Vysotsky generation, an
established doctor of science who has a nice car and
who has not left to work abroad.Skolkovo kindergar-
tens will be the best, so that grandmas can bring their
grandsons and bring them up there. I’m not joking. The
second type of Skolkovets is a young person with a
sense of their own worth.This person clearly un-
derstands that he could realize himself in any corner of








Fig. 2. Agreements or discussions of cooperation launched around Skolkovo
by private and public actors.
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Naryshkin also made a clear link between creativity and a
certain kind of utopian, ecological environment, stating
that Skolkovo will attract: ‘talented people, scientists, en-
gineers – there is a lot of human capital around which the
government places hope for achieving an innovative
development path. These people do not want to live in
industrial cities with a degraded ecology.they need a
different environment, different cultural-informational
spaces’ (in Zykova & Shadrina, 2010). Skolkovo is to be a
‘garden city’ (Eml’yanenkov, 2011), and head of Skolkovo
Fund Viktor Vekselberg underlined that the Skolkovo
buildings will be of the ‘highest caliber of green standards’
(in RG., 2012).
Making Skolkovo a city of the future also, unsurpris-
ingly, involves distinguishing it from the past. Historically,
Soviety science-cities were also realized according to a
particular modernistic esthetic with the city layout meant
to facilitate fruitful scientiﬁc exchange (Josephson,1997). In
other words, these science cities tooweremeant to be cities
of the future. The Skolkovo project’s utopian vision of the
new city of innovation that is to be built shares much with
this Soviet heritage. However, the tradition of ‘science cit-
ies’ is also an historical element from which Skolkovo
proponents have actively distanced themselves and the
project.
Those involved in Skolkovo were at pains to underline
that Skolkovo is a very different project from the traditional
‘science city’ built during the Soviet period. Vladislav Sur-
kov put it this way (in Omel’chenko, 2010):
We have lovely scientiﬁc centers that were established
back in the Soviet period in Siberia and around Moscow
and in many other regions. There are lovely specialists
working there. But our task is not to do superﬁcial up-
grades (evroremont) on our Soviet home, our task is to
build a new house with a new economy. And for this
sometimes it is useful to start from scratch.
An interview with three Skolkovo tops (Naumov, Sitni-
kov and Bel’tyukov) also spoke to this emphasis on the
future and retreat from the past. Bel’tyukov noted ‘wewon’t
beworking on something or another in our little garden, not
showing it to anyone and not interacting.Wehavenot only
tried this once and it didn’t work so well’ (in Panina, 2011)
Naumov seconded this point, stating, ‘The government isstill putting money into our science cities that were estab-
lished after the secondworldwar in keepingwith particular
historical moments’ tasks. We need to look for newmodels
and Skolkovo is one of them’ (in Panina, 2011). In other
words, the emphasis is on the future and weight of the past
(in this case, the Soviet science cities) is something that
Skolkovo actors actively tried to shrug off.
The Skolkovo project seems to have been one vehicle
through which Russia’s top leaders, especially then Presi-
dent Medvedev, also promoted a vision of a particular
future for Russia. In an early speech about the establish-
ment of Skolkovo, Medvedev argued, ‘ﬂexibility and
adaptability are the words that have become more popular
than stability and predictability. That does not make
everyone happy, but the change will continue. We are not
going to go backwards to past orders or models of devel-
opment’ (in Kuz’min & Kosheev, 2010). Medvedev later
made his point more clearly, underlining that Skolkovowas
more than innovation: ‘I want Skolkovo to be an ideolo-
gy.If we achieve this, the Skolkovo effect will be colossal’
(in Kuz’min, 2011b). Surkov notes that Skolkovo is a project
but also a potentially ‘powerful social movement’ (in Kukol,
2010c). To take another example, Tatiana Yakovleva, a
United Russia Duma representative, put it this way after the
Duma approved the Law on Skolkovo (in Shkel’, 2010b):
‘For contemporary Russia, this is without exaggeration the
project of the century.a catalyzer.it will not only be a
brand for modernization development but will also lead
the country into a new orbit.allowing us to return to the
avant garde.’ Given that one of the Putin regime’s most
important sources of legitimacy has been that of providing
for economic and political stability, the statements made
about the signiﬁcance of the Skolkovo project for Russia
more broadly are striking.
Politicians and policy actors seemed to be talking about
choices for all of Russiawhen they spoke about the future of
Skolkovo, perhaps as a small nod towards the more open
political system and the political modernization that
remained conspicuously absent from modernization rhet-
oric of the time. At the same time, the change and ‘colossal
effect’ that the Skolkovo project was said to possibly bring
about remain somewhat unspeciﬁed. This shores up the
observation that talking about modernization was a way of
talking about change without promising anything in spe-
ciﬁc (and in that way it shared characteristics with most
kinds of political slogans) (Øverland, 2011).
4. Conclusions
This article has examined socio-political discourses
surrounding the Skolkovo project, as reﬂected in the pages
of the state-owned newspaper Rossiskaya Gazeta. A
context-based analysis of these 310 texts (interviews, po-
litical speeches, articles) revealed that there were three
main themes or issues that attracted the greatest amount of
discursive space. These were how to achieve the right
balance between foreign and domestic experience and
expertise, ﬁnding a private-sector face for a primarily state-
funded and inspired endeavor and building a city of the
future (that was distinguishable from the historical Soviet
cities of the future). All of these themes also link up to the
E. Wilson Rowe / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 39–4746wider challenges facing Russia that Medvedev’s moderni-
zation campaign was meant to highlight and address. This
underlines the point made at the beginning of the article
about the importance of seeing how a state’s approach to
science and to governance are intertwined and actually
occupy the same socio-political terrain.
Much of the modernization discourse was championed
by then President Dmitry Medvedev, although the prob-
lems behind the modernization drive are well-
acknowledged in Russian policy circles and key strategic
documents. The choreographed switching of political roles
effectuated by Medvedev and Putin (between Prime Min-
ister and Presidential posts) in 2012 certainly dampened
the hopes of analysts who wanted to see Medvedev as an
independent, inﬂuential and more progressive political
force in Russia. On the other hand, the move also demon-
strated that Medvedev is an established and loyal member
of Putin’s political elite, which in some ways renders the
modernization rhetoric of Medvedev’s presidential period
more interesting. Rather than the pet project of a political
cowboy, Medvedev’s modernization rhetoric may have
been a controlled experiment of the Putin-Medvedev po-
litical teamwith Medvedev as a believable face to front the
initiative. All this suggests that there is good reason to
analyze the Skolkovo project not only for its import as a
concrete project in innovation and modernization, but also
as a location in which central socio-political discourses are
forged, contested or reinforced.
While future research should address and analyze the
causes of Skolkovo’s eventual success or failure, the dis-
courses around Skolkovo certainly show how Russia’s
challenges are understood by key actors. They are aware
that there is a tension around questions of foreign expertise
and government involvement in the economy – and
attempt to see beyond these issues by envisioning a uto-
pian future. Such political discourses about the future
should not be simply dismissed as empty talk. Despite
daunting political and economic institutional constraints,
and the question of political commitment needed to ach-
ieve such a brighter tomorrow, Skolkovo and moderniza-
tion rhetoric and visions of the future can still tell us quite a
bit about Russia. As Lowenthal (1995) puts it: ‘The nostalgic
past and the hopeful future both help to redress today’s
disappointments and shortcomings; they mirror what we
praise and reverse what we condemn in the present.’Acknowledgments
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